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It’s not the economy, stupid! External effects on the 
supply and demand of cinema entertainment1 
M. Bjørn von Rimscha – IPMZ University of Zurich 
Abstract 
The paper addresses whether the state of the economy impacts the supply of and 
demand for cinema entertainment. A literature review on the drivers of cinema supply 
and demand is provided, and two competing hypotheses are extracted. Economic 
downturns could either lead to a sober mood and drive the interest in serious genres or 
drive the need for distraction leading to an increased interest in feel-good or action 
movies. However, characteristics of the movie industry suggest that economic key 
factors have only limited effects on supply and demand. A time series analysis of supply 
and demand in three major European markets indicate that demand is unrelated to the 
state of the economy. In aggregate, the demand does not instruct supply. Fluctuations in 
individual movie quality superpose potential effects of the economic context on the 
aggregated demand. Simultaneously, a focus on film as art superposes potential effects 
of the economic context on the supply. 
                                                          
1 The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com doi: 10.1007/s10824-012-
9192-4 
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Introduction 
Every time the economy dips, trade papers and the general interest press start to 
speculate about the effects for the entertainment and movie industry. Commentators in 
the business section usually seem to be optimistic pointing to an increased need for 
distraction in times of hardship, whereas commentators from the culture section seem 
to be pessimistic, especially concerning funding for highbrow entertainment. To our 
knowledge, neither side has presented sound data to support its reasoning; both rely 
completely on anecdotal evidence. Turning to the academic literature is not satisfactory 
either, since the rather few studies provide no clear answer but raise the question 
whether the state of the economy is an important influencing factor at all. Therefore, 
we believe that this is a relevant research topic and that a sound study can contribute to 
academic and practical knowledge. A better understanding of the influence of economic 
growth on the size and nature of the demand for cinema entertainment can ultimately 
lead to a better allocation of production resources. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we will provide a literature review on existing 
studies that address the factors influencing supply of cinema entertainment and cinema 
attendance and the potential effects of economic growth on media financing and 
demand. The literature review suggests mixed and limited effects. We derive three 
research questions: 1) How does economic growth influence the overall demand for 
cinema entertainment? 2) How does it shift the respective market shares of different 
genres? And 3) do other external factors besides the state of the economy have more 
explanatory power concerning supply and demand? We then present the data and 
measures used to address these questions. Results from time series analysis using a 
vector autoregression (VAR) model will be reported. Special emphasis will be given to 
differences in supply and demand. The paper ends with a discussion and concludes that 
economic growth is a less important driver of cinema supply and demand. 
Literature Review 
Supply 
There are fairly little research results on what influences the supply of entertainment 
media. One indicator of the supply in media content is the analysis of the effect of 
economic growth and recessions on the financing and production of different media. 
Changes in the advertising revenues and thus the financial basis of most mass media 
have been attributed to GDP changes (Picard, 2001; van der Wurff, Bakker, & Picard, 
2008). The results suggest an unambiguous effect moderated by country characteristics 
and the media technology in question. Newspaper advertising corresponds relatively 
closely to economic change, whereas TV, and radio correspond relatively weakly to 
advertising reduction in times of recession. Newspaper revenues in general have also 
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been related to GDP, only to demonstrate the long-term decline of a mature industry 
and not to model short-term effects of recessions (Compaine and Gomery, 2000: 2). 
However, in contrast to newspapers and Television cinema entertainment is not funded 
indirectly through advertising, but directly by the audience. An expanding or contracting 
economy might have an effect on the volume and cost of production capital available, 
but such effects tend to be absorbed by adjusted schedules in long production cycles. 
Concerning the supply understood as those movies released rather than movie projects 
started we can expect that distributors reacted on their expectation of consumer 
demand. Bakker (2003) describes that from 1914 to 1964, US producers changed the 
content of their films according to changes in consumer sentiment: “During the 
Depression, films portraying big business and wealth positively gave way to films 
criticizing big business and being slightly more inclusive towards women and minorities. 
Despite their reliance on Wall Street capital and a draconian Production Code, the 
studios had to adapt their films to consumer preferences or go under” (Bakker, 2003: 
105). That said, it must be amended that “consumer preferences” in this case is a 
synonym for public opinion rather than an economic indicator such as the Consumer 
Confidence Index introduced in 1967. 
Caves identified a self-centered attitude of producers of creative content – what he calls 
the art for art’s sake property of creative production (Caves 2000). Several studies show 
that this artistic or creative orientation is evident not only among producers, but also 
among distributors in the television business (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2008; von 
Rimscha and Siegert 2011). While some distributors are oriented only towards profit 
maximization, others – especially in the art-house or public service sector – seem to 
have a sense of a mission and an orientation towards society. They publish media 
content that is not necessarily in high demand but nevertheless considered as worthy 
and important for the self-reflection and cohesion of society. This also corresponds with 
the traditional reluctance of many movie industry executives to rely on market research 
data (Handel 1953) rather relying on intuition and personal taste (von Rimscha 2012). 
Existing studies suggest that historical events may alter genres. Silverblatt (2010: 66), for 
instance, argues that the terror attacks on the World Trade Center in New York in 2001 
would have changed the crime genre in the US, leading to a darker and more uncertain 
perspective on a world in which it would be difficult to trust anyone. More general 
McIntosh, Schwegler, and Terry-Murray (2011) found that between 1960 and 1990 in 
times of “threat”, the highest rated US television shows were more meaningful and 
confronted more serious issues. Threat was broadly defined as increases in 
unemployment, consumer price index, prime interest rate, bombings, crime, work 
stoppages, suicide, homicide, and divorce. Comparably, the lyrics of chart hits in the US 
between 1955 and 2003 were found to be more meaningful, comforting, and romantic 
in times of threatening social and economic conditions (Pettijohn and Sacco, 2009). The 
authors explain this with what they call the environmental security hypothesis (ESH) 
(Pettijohn and Tesser, 1999), whereby threatening and uncertain circumstances would 
lead individuals to prefer mature and serious alternatives. Reciprocal, we can assume 
that the environmental situation has first affected the producers and distributors to 
offer this kind of content. Pettijohn has also tested his ESH in relation to movie genres 
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(2003). The results did not support the hypothesis, indicating an increased demand for 
comedies rather than dramas in hard times; however, he only analyzed the top five films 
in the USA per year. 
Overall we find little support in the literature for a strong influence of the state of the 
economy on the supply of movies – overall as well as in terms of preferred genres. 
Demand  
To date, there is only one study publicly available that analyzes GDP as a predictor for 
cinema demand. In her regression analysis, explaining the influences on the long-term 
decline of cinema admission, Pautz (2002) found no influence of GDP. However, she did 
not account for possible lagged or curvilinear effects. In the latest recession, several 
newspaper articles referred to the fact that after the Wall Street crash of 1929, cinema 
admission surged. It might be wise to disregard this as a guideline for today’s business. 
The introduction of sound spurred demand, and television as a cheap substitute to 
cinema was not yet available. Thus, the motion picture industry should not be regarded 
as recession-proof per se. Urquhart (1981) shows that at least during the 1973–1975 
recession American motion pictures were clearly in decline. Vogel (2007: 74) suggests 
that in a recession leisure spending preferences shift toward lower-cost, closer-to-home 
entertainment activities. Ticket sales would remain steady or even rise during the early 
stages of a recession only to falter near the recession’s end. 
Using different variations of time series analysis, several studies model historic cinema 
demand in different countries. Belson (1958), Cameron (1986), and MacMillan and 
Smith (2001) all identify the proliferation of television as the most important driver of 
cinema attendance in Britain. However, the effect of the video recorder as the next 
innovation in audio-visual home entertainment is less agreed upon. Some authors state 
that it has lured the audience away from the cinema (Cameron, 1988), and others think 
it has just expanded the market (Wood and O’Hare, 1991). 
Cameron (1990) finds a strong income elasticity of demand for cinema tickets. Likewise, 
MacMillan and Smith (2001) suggest that cinema consumption is a normal commodity 
where consumption proportionally increases with more disposable income. We know of 
no studies that suggest cinema attendance would be a necessity good (demand rises 
with income, but share of budgets shrinks) or a luxury good (demand rises 
disproportionately with income, increasing the share of budget spending). Dewenter 
and Westermann (2005) show that for the German market, income elasticities are 
significantly reduced when more influences on cinema attendance are accounted for. 
However, they show strong and consistent price elasticity. Similar results are presented 
by Fernández Blanco and Baños Pino (1997) for the Spanish market. They find that 
cinema demand is elastic with regard to price and income; however, the coefficient 
value is much higher for price. Collins and Hand (2005) analyzed movie going behavior 
on an individual level and find that the probability of going to the movies is higher in 
well off socioeconomic groups. One could thus expect, that a societal shift toward higher 
ranging socioeconomic groups might drive aggregated demand. Beyond income and 
price elasticity, cinema attendance has also been explained using a rational addiction 
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framework (Sisto and Zanola, 2010) and Hand (2002) uses an ARIMA model to forecast 
cinema admission in Britain. He uses only historic admission data and neglects any 
possible influence of price dynamics and economic growth. 
Economic growth has an impact on the demand for media content. Consumer 
confidence, which is closely related to the economic outlook, not only influences the 
willingness to buy durable goods (Throop, 1992) but also influences how prepared 
people are to spend on service expenditures such as travel and leisure. Malgarini and 
Margani (2007) show that consumer confidence can partly explain consumption 
patterns even after controlling for disposable income and GDP. This is especially true for 
service expenditures.  
More recently, the impact of the relationship among consumer confidence, the 
economy, and the news media has been studied. Usually this impact is modeled as news 
media affecting consumer or voter sentiment (Goidel and Langley, 1995; Tims, Fan, and 
Freeman, 1989); however, Hagen (2005) showed the state of the economy, media 
coverage, and the consumer sentiment to be interdependent. Zullow (1991) used 
entertainment media content, that is, the pessimism in lyrics of US chart hits, as a 
predictor for consumer optimism and an indirect predictor for GNP growth. However, a 
potential effect of consumer confidence on the consumption and content of 
entertainment media has not been studied.  
In the context of the environmental security hypotheses mentioned earlier the influence 
of different kinds of threats on the viewing behavior was compared (Gowgiel and 
McIntosh, 2010). The authors found that the perceived physical threat in the aftermath 
of the World Trade Center attacks in New York did alter the TV audience’s viewing 
behavior toward more serious and violent fare. Contrarily, the economic threat 
represented in the 2008 recession did not alter the viewing habits. Likewise, Webster 
(2008) has found that the ESH can only be supported for existential threats, not for 
economic downturns.  
Although the studies reported so far suggest some influence there are some limitations 
due to the good characteristics of movies. Movies are horizontally differentiated, or as 
Caves puts it there is “infinite variety” (Caves 2000). In such a situation consumers might 
become indifferent which movie to choose among a selection of similar options. Positive 
information feedback, such as earlier audience figures (Walls 1997; Hand 2001) or word 
of mouth (Moul 2007; McKenzie 2009) lead to a concentration of demand on few 
successful movies. Walls refers to a winner-take-all property. However, given that the 
movie market includes commercial movies as well as art-house movies, there is buyer 
heterogeneity, and “niche products often retain pockets of loyal users” (Schmalensee 
2000) – the long tail in a winner-take-most market. Apart from the attractiveness 
evolved in a network of potential viewers the actual quality of the movies also fluctuates 
though it is hard to measure reliable and on a uniform scale (Ginsburgh and Weyers 
1999). 
To sum up, existing results suggest a connection between the state of the economy and 
cinema demand; however, this theory has not been thoroughly tested. In terms of 
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content, we can conclude that existing studies suggest that the audience’s demand for 
different types of content is influenced by environmental conditions; however, the 
influence of economic variables is disputed. The perspective of movies cheering up or 
distracting, which is popular in the general press, is evident in one study but not 
otherwise addressed in the academic literature. In terms of movie traits, we can 
conclude that quality variations and network effects among members of the audience 
might have a strong dynamic effect on movie demand masking other potential factors. A 
hugely popular box office hit like Avatar (2009) might draw people to the cinemas even 
if the economic setting during the financial crisis might suggest declining demand or a 
greater interest in another genre.  
Research Questions 
Recent studies of cinema attendance have been undertaken on an extremely aggregated 
level and generally neglected the content. Demand is described by price-elastic or 
substitute leisure activities. Changes in demand for certain types of movies have been 
attributed to changes in consumer tastes (Peterson and Anand, 2004: 317-8). Supply is 
described mainly from the perspective of film studies. Changes in supply are attributed 
to creative trends (e.g., Langford, 2005).2 In contrast our research question is focused on 
the explanatory power – or weakness – of economic growth. 
To what extent can the state of the economy explain supply of and demand 
for cinema entertainment? 
Does the state of the economy influence the genre mix of the supply and the 
demand?  
One suggestion would be that consumer confidence as a result of economic growth 
influences the taste of the audience. Here we find two competing hypotheses. Either the 
audience longs for distraction, which would drive demand for feel-good movies like 
comedies and kinetic eye-candy like fantasy movies, or they are in a sober mood ready 
to consume serious fare such as drama and documentaries, as suggested by the ESH. To 
cater for fluctuations in the quality of the movies on offer we also include a quality 
measure as control variable. This lead to our last research question where we want to 
clarify whether there actually is a direct connection between supply and demand. Thus 
we ask: 
Do other external influences besides the state of the economy have equal or 
maybe higher explanatory power concerning supply of and demand for 
cinema entertainment? 
                                                          
2 Wyatt (1994) is an exception here. However, his description of the emergence of the “high 
concept” movie is about making a movie a marketable package independent of the genre. 
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Method 
The objective of this study is threefold. First, we analyze whether there is a general 
impact of GDP, consumer confidence, the development of consumer prices, disposable 
household income or ticket price on the movie industry. By analyzing the number of 
movies released (supply) as well as the box office revenue (demand), we can distinguish 
between the reaction of the industry and that of the audience. In a second step, we 
capture possible shifts in the market shares of different genres by analyzing genre-
specific supply and demand. Judging from the literature we expect limited and delayed 
effects of changes in economic indicators on supply and demand for cinema 
entertainment. The time lag is likely to differ for the variables. Consumer confidence and 
demand may change synchronously while it would take some time for distributors to 
adjust supply to a changed GDP.3 In a third step we analyze whether there is actually a 
reciprocal relation between supply and demand and introduce historic event as 
alternative explanation. We use a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to capture the 
linear interdependencies among the time series of the state of the economy and the 
supply and demand for cinema entertainment. VAR modeling allows to incorporate auto 
regression (the extent to what a variable can be explained with its own past values) and 
the effect of other variables and their lagged values. 
It is reasonable to suspect country characteristics to moderate relations between 
economic indices and cinema entertainment. For example, the volatility of the economy 
might have an influence: strong booms or recessions might have stronger effects than 
smaller ones. Different national characters (Terracciano et al., 2005) might also regulate 
how people react toward the challenge of a downturn. Country stereotypes suggest a 
broad range from drowning sorrows in alcohol to laughing them away. Thus, we will 
compare the effects in three countries with different backgrounds. We use three 
European countries representing the three types of media systems suggested by Hallin 
and Mancini (2004): Germany for the democratic corporatist model, the United Kingdom 
(UK) for the liberal model, and Spain for the polarized pluralist model. The initial plan to 
include an emerging economy in the sample had to be discarded due to insufficient data 
quality and missing data in the time series. 
Measures 
The sample period is from the first quarter in 2000 until the fourth quarter in 2010. GDP 
data and data on the evolution of consumer prices and disposable household income 
was taken from the OECD database for all analyzed countries, while data on the 
consumer confidence was taken from the consumer studies commissioned by the 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) of the European 
                                                          
3 Supply in this context refers solely to distribution decisions whether to rush a movie to market, 
withhold another one, or pick up movies of a certain genre from independent producers. The 
planning horizon for feature films is far too long to accurately address the possible state of the 
economy when the movie is released after two to four years. The state of the economy might just 
as well influence the mindset of screenwriters and producers; however, these potential effects 
are superposed during the production cycle. 
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Commission 
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/index_en.htm). The 
ticket price could be obtained on a quarterly basis only for the German market using 
data provided by the FFA (German federal film board). The measure for movie quality 
was derived from the Internet Movie Database (IMDb). We did not follow the example 
of (Ginsburgh and Weyers 1999) who relied on awards and movie guides for expert 
judgments, since most movies never get mentioned or awarded. Rather than taking box 
office revenues as consumer judgment of quality we referred to the user rating where 
IMDb users can rate a film using a scale from 1 to 10. The rating and the number of 
votes per film where used to calculate a weighted average quality score per genre and 
quarter4. Supply data, that is, the information how many movies in each genre where 
released, and Box office figures differentiated along genre boundaries (demand) was 
drawn from Rentrak, an entertainment market research outfit. Table 1 provides an 
overview of the variables and their sources. 
Rentrak does not use the same set of 22 non-exclusive genres IMDb does, but a reduced 
set of just 13 and assigns them to one main genre.5 Thus, the Rentrak data does not 
allow for assessing the trend toward multi-genre movies (Altman, 1999) but offers data 
from a business rather than a movie buff’s perspective present in IMDb. To match the 
different genre categories used by IMDb and Rentrak and to simplify the models, all 
movies were assigned to three umbrella genres with distinct and selective usage 
motivations (Nabi and Wirth, 2008): 
• Serious: A combination of the drama, documentary, history and biography, and 
thriller genres. The audience presumably watches this umbrella genre for 
reflection and intellectual stimulation (cognitive reception mode). 
• Feel-good: A combination of the animation, comedies, romances, and musicals 
genres. The audience presumably watches this umbrella genre for distraction 
and for cheering up (affective/emotional reception mode). 
• Kinetic: A combination of genres that focus on kinetic action and visual 
attractiveness such as action, adventure, sci-fi, horror, and fantasy. The 
audience presumably watches this umbrella genre also for distraction, however 
in a more physical and exciting way (conative reception mode). 
 
Table 1: Overview of the variables and their sources 
 Variable Level Source 
“explanatory“ 
variables 
Gross domestic product 
Per country: 
DE / UK / ES OECD 
Consumer prices  
(indexed) 
Disposable household 
                                                          
4 This quality score is somewhat problematic, since all user votes ever entered on IMDb is 
included. IMDb does not allow to create scores using only votes from one country or a certain 
time span. We can expects, that this kind of overall measurement reduces actual differences.  
5 Only in some cases there is a secondary genre indicated. 
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income 
Consumer confidence 
(indexed) DG ECFIN 
Cinema ticket price DE only Federal Film Board 
Movie quality  
(as assessed by the audience) 
Global score: 
overall / per 
genre 
IMDb 
“result” 
variables 
Movie supply  
(in published titles) 
Per country: 
overall / per 
genre 
Rentrak 
Movie demand (Box office) 
 
Method 
In time series analysis, changes in the data series can be distinguished among trend, 
cycle, seasonal, and remaining components (Lütkepohl, 2004; Schlittgen, 2001). The 
trend component describes a long-term development of the series that is not modeled 
but caused by an external factor. A cyclical component describes variations of the trend 
component in the medium term, while the seasonal component captures short-term 
differences related to the different levels of economic activity during a year. The 
remaining component is composed of random fluctuations, outliers or structural breaks, 
and, most importantly, the proposed effect between two times series. 
Trend components can be eliminated by using a differentiated series rather than the 
original series, seasonal components can be included in the model as exogenous 
regressors. By this means, spurious correlations can be avoided and the premise of 
mean stationarity can be addressed (Brockwell and Davis, 2006). Regressing integrated 
time series leads to overestimated regression coefficients. To exclude stochastic trends, 
a common strategy is to use growth rates. Unfortunately, this also means lost 
information and one less observation (first-order differentiation). 
In the following we will present how the data was prepared for the analysis. We could 
use the original time series of the share of feel-good, kinetic, and serious movies both in 
supply and demand for all sampled countries since the data can be considered 
stationary (see figures 2–7). Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests detected no unit root 
and thus showed no need to use differentiated series. The quality measure also showed 
no trend component. However, the time series of the economic indicators GDP, 
consumer confidence index (CCI), consumer price index (CPI), disposable household 
income and ticket price clearly show a trend and are integrated of first order (see figure 
1). ADF tests suggested using growth rates (first differentiation) instead of the original 
time series. Furthermore, a Chow test revealed a structural break in 2008 Q1 in the GDP 
series for Spain. While the economic crisis starting in 2008 did not interrupt the long-
term trend of the GDP in the other two countries, it did in Spain. Thus, we introduced a 
crisis dummy variable in the dataset for Spain. As the shares of each genre are collinear, 
we will only run bivariate VAR models that estimate the interaction between the 
economic indicators and genres one at a time. 
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Figure 1: Development of economic indicators in Germany (Indexed: 2000Q1=100) 
 
Results 
We will first present the results for the German market as reference case. To avoid 
redundancy, results for the other three markets will only be presented in terms of 
difference from the reference case. 
Germany 
Economy  Supply  
We find no effect of the economy on the genre mix of the supply of movies. We 
modeled multiple VAR models to capture a potential relation among GDP, CCI, and CPI 
on the one hand and the share of the three umbrella genres serious, feel-good, and 
kinetic in the overall supply on the other hand. No Granger causality could be found in 
either case. The genre mix cannot be better explained using economic indicators and 
vice versa. The state of the economy and the genre mix of the total supply seems to be 
unrelated; however, using the overall genre mix might obstruct possible reactions of a 
subset of movie distributors more wary of the economy. 
There seems to be a connection between the GDP and the overall supply measured in 
the number of films released, however. Table 2 provides the results of the VAR model 
estimation. The number of films released is influenced by the number of films released 
in the preceding quarter (lag 1) and three quarters before (lag 3). The coefficients are 
positive, indicating a positive feedback. Moreover, the number of films released in the 
preceding quarter (lag 1) also has a small but significant influence on the GDP growth 
rate. The higher the number of films released, the higher the GDP growth rate will be in 
the following quarter. 
Table 2: VAR model of GDP growth rate (GDP_gr) and total movies released (supply_sum) 
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Equation Parms RMSE R2 p 
GDP_gr 10 .849 0.348 0.115 
supply_sum 10 12.089 0.803 0.000 
 
 Coef. Std. Err. t p 
GDP growth rates (dependent variable GDP_gr) 
GDP_gr     
L1 .416 .177 2.35 0.026 
L2 .009 .191 0.05 0.962 
L3 .150 .171 0.88 0.388 
supply_sum     
L1 .030 .012 2.48 0.019 
L2 -.011 .016 -0.68 0.501 
L3 -.018 .013 -1.39 0.176 
Total movies released (dependent variable supply_sum) 
GDP_gr     
L1 -1.695 -2.521 0.67 0.507 
L2 .0126 2.719 0.00 0.996 
L3 -.7793 2.441 -0.32 0.752 
supply_sum     
L1. .660 .174 3.80 0.001 
L2. -.191 .226 -0.85 0.403 
L3. .486 .183 2.65 0.013 
Sample: 2001 quarter 1–2010 quarter 4, n = 40 observations. 
For brevity reasons, we do not report the coefficients for the seasonal dummies and the 
constant. 
On the 10% significance level, the number of films released Granger causes a GDP 
growth rate. That is, there is a lead lag between the two variables (Granger, 1969). The 
Granger method tests whether the number of films released (supply_sum) helps to 
predict GDP growth rate (GDP_gr) or vice versa by the use of previous lags of 
supply_sum and GDP_gr. If GDP_gr can be better predicted using the histories of both 
GDP_gr and supply_sum than using the history of GDP_gr alone, supply_sum Granger 
causes GDP_gr – or supply_sum improves the prediction of GDP_gr – and vice versa. The 
results are displayed in Table 2 
Table 3: Granger causality test of GDP growth rate and number of films released in Germany 
Causal direction F p 
supply_sum  GDP_gr 2.39 0.09 
GDP_gr  supply_sum .25 0.86 
Sample: 2001 quarter 1–2010 quarter 4, n = 40 observations. 3 lags 
If we only include films that are released for the first time during the quarter in 
question, the Granger causality between supply_sum and GDP_gr becomes even more 
pronounced and more significant (F=3.36, p=0.03).  
Clearly in this case we cannot assume Granger causality to be equal to real causality but 
an indication of a spurious relation to a third variable. Nevertheless, the number of films 
released can be interpreted as weak early indicator of changes in the GDP. Movie 
distributors adjust the volume of their output prior to the actual change in the economy.  
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Economy  Demand 
We find no significant connection between the economic indicators GDP, CCI, CPI, ticket 
price and the genre mix measured as shares of the umbrella genres or the overall 
demand. No Granger causality can be found in either instance.  
Consistent with the studies referred to in the literature review we find an influence of 
the disposable household income on the overall demand, whereby the income Granger 
causes the demand. However, the effect has a long delay: Four quarters after the 
household income raises the total box office declines (Table 4). Thus going to the cinema 
is indeed a low cost leisure activity that is replaced by more expensive activities when 
the disposable income rises. 
Table 4: VAR model of disposable household income growth rate (GDP_gr) and total movie 
revenue (demand_sum) 
Equation Parms RMSE R2 p 
hh_income_gr 6 .727 0.184 0.205 
demand_sum 6 .000 0.564 0.000 
 
 Coef. Std. Err. t p 
Disposable household income growth rates (dependent variable 
hh_income_gr) 
hh_income_gr     
L4 -.293 .157 -1.86 0.071 
demand_sum     
L4 .007 .004 1.69 0.100 
Total box office revenue (dependent variable demand_sum) 
hh_income_gr     
L4 -20.965 5.901 -3.55 0.001 
demand_sum     
L4. -.030 .154 0.20 0.844 
Sample: 2001 quarter 1–2010 quarter 4, n = 40 observations. 
For brevity reasons, we do not report the coefficients for the seasonal dummies and the 
constant. Wald lag exclusion tests showed that lag 1-3 can be excluded from the model. 
However, the change in disposable household income does not affect respective 
revenue share of the three umbrella genres. Thus the genre mix cannot be better 
explained using economic indicators and vice versa.  
Demand  Supply 
Distributors in Germany do not refer to the state of the economy when deciding what 
genres to publish but apparently use other criteria to decide. Since we find little 
evidence for economic influence on supply and demand in cinema entertainment, we 
should take a step back and analyze the relationship between demand and supply. If the 
industry in general had profit maximization as its goal – which is contested by some 
researchers – changes in the genre mix on the demand side should lead to accordant 
adjustments in the genre mix on the supply side in following quarters. The comparison 
of supply and demand figures reveals a strong disparity between the two. Film 
enthusiasts might regard this as proof of their understanding of film as art, while more 
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market-oriented types might call this neglecting consumer interest. Between 2000 Q1 
and 2009 Q4 46.2% (SD=.045) of all films released in Germany were of a serious genre 
(drama, documentary, thriller). In the same period these genres captured only 24.9% 
(SD=.105) of the box office. Thus, serious genres were heavily oversupplied by 21.8 
percentage points. The standard deviations show that supply is relatively invariant, 
while demand is fluctuating more. Conversely, feel-good movies (comedy, romance, 
etc.) captured 40.7% (SD=.099) of the audience market with only 31.9% (SD=.040) of the 
supply, and kinetic movies (action, adventure, horror, etc.) fared relatively better, with a 
34.3% (SD=.127) revenue share out of the 21.7% (SD=.022) supply share. Out of 40 
quarters, the movies with serious genres had the biggest share in supply for 37 quarters 
and the lowest share in the audience demand for 25 quarters. To put it in statistical 
terms, the Pearson correlation between supply and demand ranges from r=.15 for 
serious genres to r=.39 for feel-good genres and is significant (p<.05) only for the latter.  
If we estimate VAR models to detect lagged effects, it turns out that in all three markets 
the share of serious films in demand has no lagged effect on the share in supply. The 
supply share is determined only by the lagged supply share. The supply share of feel-
good movies is Granger caused by the demand share (F= 2.30, p= 0.07). A higher share 
of feel-good movies on the demand side leads to a higher share of feel-good movies on 
the supply side. The effect occurs on a short term within one or two quarters. For kinetic 
movies supply and demand Granger cause each other indicating a reciprocal relation. 
When analyzing the quarterly revenue data for cinemas, we find that variations in 
demand in all three analyzed markets correlate with the release dates of extraordinarily 
successful movies. Thus, a potential effect of the state of the economy might be 
superposed by fluctuations in the quality of the released movies. The movie industry 
might not constantly be able to offer a slate of movies capable of capturing the 
complete potential audience interest. However on the level of umbrella genres we find 
no connection between the quality of the supply and the demand, neither direct nor 
lagged and in none of the sampled countries. Aggregation in umbrella genres seems to 
hide the effects of individual movies. Summing up, we can conclude that the movie 
market needs to be divided into different submarkets. While distributors in the feel-
good market seem to be demand oriented, those in the serious market seem to be fairly 
deaf toward the market demand and subsequently are unlikely to address changes in 
audience demand. To be fair, we should add that distributers can only release what 
producers offer, and producers are more likely to churn out dramas because they are 
less expensive than special-effects-laden action movies or summer comedies with all-
star casts. People who produce movies to create art usually produce dramas rather than 
comedies. Our results of the oversupply of serious movies is also in line with the findings 
of Ravid and Basuroy (2004) who explain an oversupply in violent films with a 
managerial focus on revenue maximization and excessive hedging. 
Historic events 
If the economic and quality indicators cannot sufficiently explain the shifts in the genre 
structure of movie supply and demand, and demand only partly instructs supply, other 
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influencing factors might be more powerful explicators. We follow the approach of 
Gowgiel and McIntosh (2010) who suggest that different types of threats might have 
different effects on TV viewing habits. They use the attacks on the World Trade Center 
as an example of a physical threat and the collapse of the Lehman Brothers bank as 
example of an economic threat. While the former would lead to a higher demand for 
serious content, the latter would have no effect on viewing habits. Overall demand in 
our sample is fluctuating too much to render an impact-response-analysis a viable 
analytic strategy. Thus, in the following we will provide a visual inspection of the data 
and focus on changes in the genre shares in the aftermath of the same events analyzed 
by Gowgiel and McIntosh. Both events happened in the US, but they had a global 
impact, so we can also expect them to be relevant in European markets.  
In Germany we can see a pronounced reaction of the distributors in the aftermath of 
historic events (see Figure 2). After the terror attacks on the World Trade Center and 
likewise after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the share of serious films rose, 
predominantly due to an increasing number of documentaries released. At the same 
time, the share of feel-good movies dropped. It seems as if distributors assumed a need 
for explanation among a sober audience. However, the audience reaction uniformly 
responded to this change in the mix of film genres offered (see Figure 3). After 9/11, the 
demand for kinetic movies expanded, while the share of kinetic movies on offer had 
hardly changed. Contrarily, after the Lehman Brothers collapse marking the beginning of 
the financial crisis, indeed the audience showed a greater interest in the rising number 
of serious films, while the demand for feel-good movies dropped. 
Figure 2: Supply structure in Germany and historic events 
 
Figure 3: Demand structure in Germany and historic events 
Lehman collapse 9/11 
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We can conclude that on the supply side the distributors show a more pronounced 
reaction on external event than the audience on the demand side. This supports the 
view of distributors not only reacting on the demand but acting based on a sense of a 
mission. 
United Kingdom 
Economy  Supply 
Just like in the German market, we find no significant relation between CCI or CPI and 
the genre share or the number of films released in the UK market. 
Contrary to our findings on the German market, in the UK, the estimation of a VAR 
model linking the number of films released with the GDP growth rate indicated an 
influence of GDP on supply. The first lag of GDP_gr has a significant positive effect on 
supply_sum. A test for Granger causality reveals the opposite causality direction than on 
the German market: GDP leads supply (Table 5). 
Table 5: Granger causality test of GDP growth rate and number of films released in the UK 
Causal direction F p 
supply_sum  GDP_gr 1.44 0.25 
GDP_gr  supply_sum 3.10 0.04 
Sample: 2001 quarter 1–2010 quarter 4, n = 40 observations. 3 lags 
We cannot replicate the results found in Germany, and thus there is no universal pattern 
of how distributors react on changes in the GDP growth rate. While distributors seem to 
anticipate changes in Germany, in the UK they only react when change has already 
happened. 
Moreover, for the UK we find a significant (p=.06) effect of the GDP growth rate on the 
share of feel-good movies. A higher GDP growth rate leads to a (marginally) higher share 
of feel-good movies in the following quarter (coefficient= .009). Conversely, when the 
economy shrinks the audience turns away from feel-good movies. However, the 
Lehman collapse 9/11 
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explanatory power of this VAR model is rather weak (R2= 0.34), and thus we cannot 
interpret this result as support for the ESH. 
Economy  Demand 
As for the German market, we found no significant relation between any of the 
economic indicators and any of the demand figures. Just like in Germany, movie demand 
in the UK seems to be driven by other factors. 
Demand  Supply 
While the actual values in the correlations between demand and supply differ slightly 
from the German market the pattern remains the same in the UK. Clearly there are 
more serious movies offered than there is demand for them. Again we find no Granger 
cause relation between demand and supply of serious movies; and again we find that 
the demand for feel-good movies Granger causes the respective supply. In the UK, 
kinetic demand Granger causes kinetic supply. Just like in Germany fluctuation in the 
quality of the movies supplied does not influence the aggregated demand. Thus in the 
UK we have the strongest support for the hypotheses of distributors reacting on the 
audience demand. 
Historic events 
A comparison with the other sampled countries reveals that we cannot assume a 
general pattern in which economic threats drive both supply and demand of serious fare 
while existential threats lead to more serious supply as the audience longs for 
distraction. In the UK, distributors’ reactions to both 9/11 and the Lehman Brothers 
collapse is much less evident.  
Figure 4: Supply structure in the UK and historic events 
 
Figure 5: Demand structure in the UK and historic events 
Lehman collapse 9/11 London bombings 
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After 9/11 the demand for kinetic movies slightly rose with a steep dip in the next 
quarter. After the attacks on the public transport in London (2005 Q3), demand for 
kinetic movies is substituted with serious movies. After the Lehman Brothers collapse, 
the demand for serious movies rose in Britain only in the second quarter, which seems 
to be a seasonal pattern. In the UK, serious movies regularly draw a larger audience 
share in the first quarter of each year. 
Spain 
Economy  Supply 
In the Spanish market we find no significant relation between economic indicators CCI 
and CPI and the genre shares or the number of films released. To obtain a stationary 
time series for the Spanish GDP data, we used the log of GDP rather than the growth 
rate and introduced additional crisis dummy to capture the structural break caused by 
the economic crisis starting in 2008 Q1. GDP has no significant effect on the share of 
serious or kinetic films, but as in the UK we find an effect of GDP on the share of feel-
good movies. GDP Granger causes the share of feel-good movies, though with puzzling 
effects. A growing GDP leads to a decrease in feel-good movies in the next quarter but 
an increase in the quarter following. 
Table 6: VAR model of GDP log (GDP_l) and share of feel-good movies released (feelgood_ss) 
Equation Parms RMSE R2 p 
GDP_l 9 .003 0.999 0.000 
feelgood_ss 9 .025 0.680 0.000 
 
 Coef. Std. Err. t p 
GDP log (dependent variable GDP_l) 
GDP_l     
L1 1.757 .061 28.70 0.000 
L2 -.760 .059 -12.83 0.000 
supply_sum     
L1 .007 .016 0.45 0.655 
Lehman collapse 9/11 London bombings 
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L2 -.001 .016 -0.06 0.949 
Share of feel-good movies released (dependent variable feelgood_ss) 
GDP_l     
L1 -1.558 .611 -2.55 0.016 
L2 1.394 .591 2.36 0.024 
feelgood_ss     
L1 .085 .162 0.53 0.600 
L2 -.373 .164 -2.28 0.029 
Sample: 2000 quarter 3–2010 quarter 4, n = 42 observations. 
For brevity reasons we do not report the coefficients of the exogenous variables: seasonal 
dummies, constant, and crisis dummy. 
Table 7: Granger causality test of GDP log and the share of feel-good movies in the overall 
number of films released in Spain  
Causal direction F P 
feelgood_ss  GDP_l .10 0.90 
GDP_l  feelgood_ss 10.32 0.00 
Sample: 2000 quarter 3–2010 quarter 4, n = 42 observations. 2 lags 
Economy  Demand 
Again, we find no significant relation between economic indicators and demand. Thus, 
for none of the sampled countries is there an immediate or a lagged effect of GDP or 
CCI. 
Demand  Supply 
Again, just like in the German market we find a clear oversupply of serious movies and a 
weak correlation between supply and demand. A VAR model shows no lagged effect of 
demand on supply for serious and feel-good movies. However, for kinetic movies the 
demand seems to breed demand since kinetic supply Granger causes kinetic demand. 
Again we find no influence of quality fluctuations on the demand. 
Historic events 
In Spain we see the same distributor reaction to 9/11 as in Germany; however, no 
reaction to the collapse of Lehman Brothers. There is virtually no demand-side reaction 
on the attacks of the World Trade Center, and the development of the demand after the 
attacks on commuter trains in Madrid known as 11-M (2004 Q1) does not seem to be 
especially different. The aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse is characterized by 
the same rise of demand for serious movies as in Germany. 
Figure 6: Supply structure in Spain and historic events 
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Figure 7: Demand structure in Spain and historic events 
 
Discussion 
Our analysis of possible interactions between economic indicators and the genres 
sought by the audience provides support neither for the environmental security 
hypothesis nor for the competing distraction hypothesis. The demand for cinema 
entertainment as a whole is unrelated to economic indicators such as GDP, consumer 
confidence, and consumer prices. Only the disposable household income has some 
effect on the overall demand. In all three countries analyzed, a cinema visit can be 
considered as a low-cost leisure activity. We could possibly find different results for 
markets in which a cinema visit is more expensive relative to purchasing power. 
However, we find no connection between income and genre choice. We have 
contradictory results concerning the interaction between economy and movie supply. 
The results might be improved if we could add information about the average 
production budget to the number of films released. The number of films released is less 
likely to change with the GDP than the budget since the number of screens and the 
release slots remain on the same level while the production funds might dry up during a 
Lehman collapse 9/11 
Lehman collapse 9/11 
11-M 
11-M 
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recession. However, it is evident from our results that many distributors are not 
predominantly in the market for profit maximization since they constantly release more 
serious movies than are in demand. 
Distributors seem to be willing to adjust their movie portfolios to economic and societal 
changes, but they do not seem to be especially good at anticipating shifts in audience 
interest. 
Chances are that possible influences of the economy have different relevance for 
different submarkets of the movie business. We can assume that distributors in the art-
house sector have a stronger sense of the mission and are only to a lesser extent guided 
by profit maximization. On the contrary blockbuster distributors should be less sensitive 
concerning external effects besides economic key figures. To further confirm our result, 
it would be interesting to re-run the analysis with separate time series for art-house and 
blockbuster distributors or include figures on the number of screens per movie – data 
that was not available to us. 
One might also expect that there are different patterns at work for domestic and foreign 
movies possibly with a more uniform supply and demand for international movies, while 
local fare could be subject to stronger fluctuations. To test for this we doubled our 
analysis differentiating between domestic and foreign movies. Although some (serious) 
genres are known to cross borders better than others (e.g. comedies) – we could not 
find any significant differences between the two groups. Two explanations can be 
extended: Differences between the genres might be exaggerated in the literature. If a 
comedy movie like Barbershop (2002) with an Afro-American cast and theme fails to 
attract a European Audience other comedies like Bruce Almighty (2003) are well 
received. Thus, on an aggregate level this issue might be less relevant. The other 
explanation could lie in the difficulty to assign a “nationality” to a movie. Co-productions 
collect funding in several markets and are regarded as domestic in each of them. Thus 
again, differences are diminishing on an aggregate level.  
The fundamental uncertainty in the movie industry where “nobody knows” (Caves, 
2003) about the quality perception of the audience and its willingness to pay for an 
experience good superposes potential influences. The fluctuation in the quality of the 
movies released in any given time period is higher than the fluctuation of consumer 
demand induced by economic growth or recession. As long as the output quality varies 
that much, we cannot entirely rule out an effect of the state of the economy on 
demand, but we cannot measure it properly either. Furthermore reducing a film to its 
umbrella genre might be a too drastic reduction of the complexity of the product. Genre 
is but one element of a movie that can be understood as an “inseparable commodity” 
(Albert 1999). Thus it would be interesting to find out how other elements (e.g. 
archetypes, plot lines, but also stars, special effects and budget) relate to the state of 
the economy and what kind of interaction effects exist between the elements. 
Unfortunately such an approach is by and large limited to case studies of certain films, 
since it is not possible to obtain complete and comparable data for the whole output of 
the industry.  
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In terms of the influence of historic events, we cannot support the findings of Gowgiel 
and McIntosh (2010) in the TV context where existential threats would lead to a higher 
demand for serious fare, while financial threats would not. The results are inconsistent 
between the sampled countries. However, by trend, the results suggest the reverse 
relation. The distributors’ reaction to historic events seems to be influenced by country 
characteristics. While in Germany we see a clear trend towards serious movies, this is 
less evident in the UK and Spain. If we disaggregate the genres and expand the analyzed 
period, more distributor reactions to the historic events become evident. In Germany, 
for instance, in the aftermath of the Gulf War of 1990–1991, there were considerably 
more action movies The distributors might have thought “We must offer at least as 
much action in the cinema as on CNN”. At the end of sixteen years of conservative 
government under Chancellor Kohl, the supply of comedies dried up, and tightened 
labor market legislation (Hartz IV) was accompanied by a much enlarged share of 
romance movies. The reasoning might have been “Times are getting tough for our 
audience; we should give them a private perspective”. The lagged reaction on the terror 
attacks of 9/11 was a larger number of comedies possibly in an effort to cheer everyone 
up. The answer to the collapse of Lehman Brothers at the height of the recent financial 
crisis was a larger offering of documentaries. All of these fluctuations result from the 
programming decisions of distributors who decide to postpone movies they might 
regard as inappropriate and release movies they might not have released at all in 
different times. Apparently after 9/11, distributors believed that there is a need for 
distraction, while in the financial crisis they thought the audience would long for an 
explanation. The audience does not always react as predicted by the distributors, 
however. In the third and fourth quarters of 2001, comedies were popular, but fantasy 
movies were even more so. In this case, the popularity of individual movies might distort 
the overall picture. The first part of the hugely successful Lord of the Rings trilogy was 
released in late 2001. In 2008 the audience did not respond to the increased number of 
documentaries, and the market share of documentaries at the box office remained at 
around 1%. We can conclude that, just as economic key data, historic events are not 
sufficient to explain shifts in the genre mix on the demand or supply sides of the movie 
market. Success it seems remains an attribute that is best described in retrospect and on 
an individual basis. 
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